















We are all encouraged to engage in interdisciplinary research and to hold interdisciplinary conferences. The question is: why? What are the kinds of merits that interdisciplinary connection brings to research? Our current focus is, of course, research into the nature of time. This present volume, for example, brings together physicists, biologists, philosophers, geologists, palaeontologists and more, who discuss very different aspects of time and our experience thereof, ranging from Ismael’s (chapter 1) discussion of why we seem to experience time as flowing or passing (even though, according to most physicists it does not do so), through to John Huss’s (chapter 9) discussion of ‘deep time’ and our epistemic access to past events via fossil record. Indeed, we find widely divergent use of the term ‘time’ throughout this anthology, ranging from Annick Lesne’s (chapter 3) focus on an operational definition of time in terms of the measurement of physical phenomena, through to the physicists conception of time (embodied in chapters 6, (Huw Price and Ken Wharton) 7  (Joseph Berkovitz) and 8 (Anouk Barberousse and Vincent Ardourel)   through to discussion of the concept of time deployed in palaeontology (Huss, chapter 9 and Pascal Tussy chapter 11) and to the differences between the paleontological concept and that of the biologist (de Ricqlès, chapter 10). 
 
Given the various different concepts here deployed, one might ask what all these papers are doing together, and what we can learn from this interdisciplinary interaction? Perhaps more crucially, what are the connections between their research—in what sense are they researching the same topic, and does (or should) what goes on in one of these disciplines constrain what goes on in another?

In some domains the rationale for interdisciplinary research is fairly clear and easy to articulate. Suppose, for example, that you are interested in the spread of the H7N9 bird flu this season. You may want to get epidemiologists, microbiologists, public health information theorists, immunologists, agricultural economists and more into a room. The target for the interaction would be straightforward — we want to minimize the spread and impact of a particular virus. The microbiologists and virologists can tell us about the problem at a cellular level, the epidemiologists can tell us of the likely infection patterns. The immunologists can try to tell us how immune systems will respond, and this is the information that epidemiologists need to know to create their models. The microbiologists and virologists can provide the veterinary biologists with information about the kind of micro-environment that might be relevant to whether the virus will spread amongst birds. The agricultural economists can tell us how economically feasible are the changes to agricultural practice that would minimize the spread of said virus. Public health researchers can tell us how we could change special practice to reduce the spread of the virus, and so on.
 
In such a case there is reasonably clear focus regarding what information needs to be shared between disciplines: namely just that information that will aid in a particular goal. In the case just discussed that goal is minimizing the spread of the H7N9 virus. Of course exactly what information will aid the goal in question may not always be obvious, so there’s reason to pump as much information between disciplines as possible in the hope that there will be serendipitous consequences that will help us fulfil the goal.

At the other end of the scale from our fictional H7N9 project is the current fashion for postmodern exhibitions in galleries and museums. An example is an exhibition at a prominent southern hemisphere art museum entitled “feathers”. It included paintings of feathers, feather headdresses, paintings of rooms in which there were items of furniture that included upholstery (which we were presumably meant to suppose contained feathers). It included displays devoted to corrupt politicians, who were feathering their nests. There was no explanatory agenda, perhaps rightly given the context, and it was very unclear that there was much in common between the subject matter of the exhibits barring the fact that each could prompt the use of the English word ‘feather’. What one learned from the exhibition was something about the arbitrariness of categorization. One supposes that the point was supposed to be that it was revealing of the arbitrariness of all categorical practice; if so then certainly it revealed it of itself.
 
And so we come to theorizing about time. Where between these poles does interdisciplinary work about the nature of time fall?
 
We think that it isn’t at the clear and easy end. There’s no empirical outcome that rationalizes the research. Sadly we are not in the business of creating more time, or developing time travel, and asking for interdisciplinary contributions whose salience can be measured against that clear objective. Rather, our task is the more nebulous one of gaining understanding of, or explaining, temporal phenomena. The issue of whether the different disciplines are talking about the same or closely connected things thus has independent force.

Let’s return briefly to our H7N9 example again. What if we were not explicitly interested in particular outcomes but just interested, ultimately, in something like an account of what H7N9 is—in its nature? You might, at first blush, be tempted to say something like this. At one level only the virologist (from the above list of specializations) is in a position to settle the question, and it is to them we must go for an answer, for H7N9 is, after all, a virus. At another level, though, the other specializations might provide answers, but answers that are at cross-purposes: answers which address different explanatory concerns. Someone might tell you that H7N9 is a major cause on special panic in Hong Kong; others might tell you it is a pandemic amongst poultry in live markets in Vietnam. A pandemic is not a virus. But this is merely apparent disagreement, since what we have are not competing accounts of the very same thing. Notice that such disagreement bears a startling similarity to certain disagreements about time that one sometimes finds at the interdisciplinary coal-face. We recall a time when the claim, made by some anthropologists, that time is circular, was met with an incredulous stare by some physicists and philosophers of science. But there was no real disagreement. Anthropologists claimed, and perhaps rightly so, that some communities of people represent time and temporality very differently to others, and that some represent it as being circular or cyclical rather than linear. The anthropologist’s interest lay in the way in which certain cultural practices and certain ways of thinking about temporality structured the day-to-day living of societies. This explanatory project was, unsurprisingly, entirely orthogonal to that of the physicist. Two explanatory projects; two merely apparently inconsistent claims. Returning to our example, is there a way in which a single explanatory endeavour—a unified account of H7N9—can be furthered by interdisciplinary cooperation?

Here’s a thought. Virology or microbiology can’t play, by itself, what we call a subject setting role. Independent of knowing that the target of investigation is the thing that is the cause of the pandemic amongst poultry in live markets in Vietnam, and the thing that is causing special panic in Hong Kong, and so forth, the virologist will have no idea what samples to test, and thus which viruses to sequence. Before virology can begin we first need to identify a phenomenon of illness in birds and humans using, amongst other things, various special sciences. Then we need to establish, via epidemiology, that they likely have a common cause. Then a variety of sciences have to be called in to provide a good account of what samples to take and from where to take them. Only then can the virologist provide an account of what is—described at the level of virology—the target phenomenon. And that account is always subject to correction by other sciences in the event that it turns out not to be an account of the target in question. For perhaps the sequenced virus turns out not to be the cause of most infections, or to be an opportunistic virus that comes along for the ride with the significant, symptom causing, virus. Then although virologists may have told us interesting things about the nature of a particular virus, they will not have told us anything about the nature of the target phenomenon. In this sense, the output of the special sciences at least partially constrains what would count as a good account given in the language of some other science (in this case virology). Nothing that virologists discover will undermine the subject setting role of the other special sciences. Of course, discoveries in virology can lead us to say that there is no H7N9. For it might be that having examined the relevant samples virologists tell us that there is no common cause of both the pandemic amongst poultry and the symptoms amongst humans; there is no single virus responsible for both. Since according to the subject setting special sciences ‘H7N9’ was the name for the target phenomenon that is the common cause of both of these phenomena, and since according to virologists there is nothing that is the common cause of both these phenomena, it follows that there is no H7N9. Thus the interaction between the various disciplines is two-way: the special sciences downwardly constrain virology by settling what would count as discovering the H7N9 virus, and virology upwardly determines whether there is anything that answers to those constraints. 

So the fact that there isn’t a clear and straightforward pragmatic goal for interdisciplinary work on time might not mean that we must look to the postmodern gallery as a model for what we are doing. Even if our interests lie in providing a generalized theoretical account of the nature of time, it might be worth looking for an account of how disciplines can cooperate that involves some disciplines having a kind of subject setting role for others. The subject setting role is important. At present there are physicists who argue that there is no time. That is a startling claim. All the more so because the defence of a particular physical theory about the nature of our world does not, in itself, seem to be in any position to settle whether or not there is time. That’s not a matter that can be determined internal to physics itself, since the corpus of physical theory provides no resources to determine which bits of that theory or sets of theories is rightly called ‘time’ rather than, for instance, which bits of the theory or theories explains the illusion of temporality.
 
 
2. Folk Roles and the Special Sciences


Here is our proposal: one important way that interdisciplinary work on time is important is that the special sciences play a ‘subject setting’ role with respect to physics in a way which has some structural similarities to the relationship between what some philosophers call ‘folk theories’ and the location of the entities that play the folk roles.

Here’s an indicative sketch of how this story is often told​[1]​: ordinary common sense gives us ‘roles’ that indicate what it would take for certain kinds of things to exist. These roles are given in ‘folk theories’. There is a theory, for example, that there is something which underlies the bright shafts of light that appear to connect clouds and the earth during storms, and which may explain burnt stumps, bushfires and occasional deaths. There is another theory that there is some substance that accounts for most of the liquids that fall from the sky in storms, fills the rivers and lakes, and quenches thirst. These theories tell us, roughly, what it would take for lightning (in the first instance) and water (in the second) to exist. So they play a semantic, subject setting role. They don’t, however, tell us the nature of either of these things. It’s the empirical discovery that it’s a kind of electrical discharge in the first case, and H2O in the second, that plays these roles that allows us to do two things. First, it allows us to be sure that water and lightning exist; for something plays these roles, namely electrical discharge and H2O. We might instead have discovered that there is no reasonably uniform phenomenon or substance at work and thus discovered that there was, for instance, no water. Second, it allows us to determine the natures of these phenomena and therefore how to locate them in the world. For it might turn out that such phenomena exist even where they do not play the folks roles—suppose there were environments in which H20 was not clear, potable or liquid and hence does not play the folk roles. Without knowing what it is that plays the folk roles we would be unable to locate that substance as water until we knew water’s hidden nature. 

One first blush objection to such an outline of the relationship between science—or low-level disciplines like physics —and ordinary thought and talk is that folk theories are being asked to do too much work. Ordinary folk theories are too loose, too likely to be false, and too variable from person to person to make a good starting place for fundamental investigation.

The reply to this is that we aren’t concerned with just what people would say or write down. We are instead dealing with a theory that is tacit and perhaps idealized. No doubt this idealization and extraction of tacit theory can proceed in many ways. But one way we think it proceeds is via the transition from folk theory to the empirical special sciences. Some folk theories are a kind of proto-science​[2]​, and when the different tacit theories of each individual are averaged out and that remaining theory is made consistent with the high level empirical evidence what we get are the high level special sciences. These high level special sciences themselves will still be specifying roles, albeit cleaned up and precisified roles from their folk origins. Thus we propose looking to the role that time plays in the various special sciences and looking for connections between these roles. 

Thus the special sciences, insofar as they are successful—explanatory, predictive, and so forth—provide the subject setting role for the phenomenon of time. In a way this is to say that time is just whatever it is that plays some particular functional role, where the functional role is not given by a set of folk platitudes but is given by the role of the “t” term in the successful special sciences. Thus time is, within certain parameters, whatever it is that explains the success of the term “t” in biology, perception, geology, cognitive science, ecology and so forth. We could call the role that is played by “t” in these sciences (severally or jointly depending on context) the t-role. We look to physics to tell us what it is that explains the success of the t-role, but it is the special sciences that constrain what, in the physics, constitutes an answer to the question: what is time? This is because physics will have answered that latter question only when it answers tells us in virtue of what the t-role in the special sciences is explanatory.
 




2. The Special Sciences and the role of ‘t’.
 
So far we have assumed that the various t-roles found in the special sciences are consistent in the following sense: it is possible that there is a unique phenomenon, discoverable by physics, that plays all of those roles. That is, we have assumed that when each of the special sciences settle the subject matter, the subject that they settle on is, by and large, the same subject. Is there, though, any reason to suppose that is true given that the various special sciences have such different explanatory projects?

In order to answer this question we need to examine, in more detail, the disciplines themselves. We cannot hope to canvass all of these. In what follows we consider just a few, beginning with psychological sciences.


2.1 Psychology, Cognitive Science and Neuroscience

We make judgements about the order of events into earlier-than and later-than; we judge the duration of events; we judge that events are changing; we judge that events are simultaneous and we judge that events occur in a particular succession and at a particular rate. Call the collective phenomenology involved in thus experiencing events temporal phenomenology. How might we begin to try and locate time within the story given to us by physics? We might begin with nothing but physics and our temporal phenomenology and suppose that time is whatever it is in physics that our phenomenology is about, or responsive to. The problem is that there’s no way to find out what that is: there’s no bridge between physics, on the one hand, and our phenomenology, on the other. Psychology, we think, can provide that bridge. It can offer us an account of the mechanism of our temporal phenomenology that it is then (in principle) possible to examine to discover to which features of the physical world that mechanism is responsive.​[3]​

Psychology’s explanatory project is to determine what it is, at the psychological or neural level that explains our temporal phenomenology. Such explanations may do many things: they may tell us what neural states our experience supervenes on (neuroscience) and, at the functional level, what mechanism is responsible for our phenomenology (psychology and cognitive science); they may tell us how, in general, we have come to have neural states of that kind (evolutionary cognitive science and evolutionary biology) and they may also tell us what the local causes of those phenomenologies are (experimental neuroscience and psychology). 

Let us say that the usual causes of our phenomenologies are what these phenomenologies track or are responsive to, in the world. By analogy, one of the things our perceptual system tracks is middle sized objects, since middle sized objects are one of the things in the world that act as causal input to our perceptual mechanisms and their subsequent output. Then one of the subject-setting roles that psychology might play is that it is a desideratum on a theory of time in a lower level discipline that it be a theory of something in the world which contains things ordered in a way which is being tracked by the neural processes which are found to underlie our temporal phenomenology. 

Thus suppose we had a completed story about the nature of our world at the most fundamental physical level. In that story we are trying to locate time. Where should we look? We should look for a pervasive structural feature of the world to which our temporal phenomenology is ultimately responsive. To do that we look to see what psychology tells us about the mechanism or mechanisms that are responsible for our temporal phenomenology. Then we look to see what, in the complete physical story, that mechanism tracks.  That thing is a candidate to be time.

Unsurprisingly, talk of a mechanism that is responsible for our temporal phenomenology and which, in turn, tracks some feature of the world, is oversimplified. Though much about the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for our temporal phenomenology is still unknown, it is almost certain that there is no single mechanism at work. It seems likely that there dedicated and autonomous systems that underlie our judgements regarding, and phenomenology of, motion, of change and of duration and ordering. Indeed, it is largely agreed that there are at least two, and perhaps three, systems that underlie our perception of motion.​[4]​ And recently a plethora of new studies and competitor accounts have arisen regarding the mechanisms responsible for order and duration judgements.​[5]​ According to one model, duration is accomplished by means of what has been called a stopwatch: an internal generic timing mechanism that can be applied to all events.​[6]​ An alternative proposal holds that apparent duration of an interval is a function of the number of events or changes within the interval.​[7]​ This is sometimes known as the visual clock model. Whichever of these, and other, models are right, we know that which areas of the brain are active when duration is encoded depends on the nature of the task and stimulus.​[8]​ This all suggests that there is probably no single mechanism or pattern of activation in the brain that subserves judgements of duration. Matters are equally complicated if we turn to judgements of ordering. It has been suggested that experience may not comprise a single ordered timeline in which all sensations map to some point or interval on the timeline. Instead, it has recently been suggested that we sometimes experience objects or events with undefined temporal relationships.​[9]​ Ordinal processing of times is, we learn, more impoverished than ordinal processing of space. The latter benefits from retinotopic organisation of visual cortices. That is, a mapping of visual input from the retina to neurons within the visual stream. This means a good deal of spatial information can be attained pre-attentively. The brain has no corresponding chronotopy, which might be one reason why evidence suggests that the representation of temporal order is sometimes impoverished. Still, once again, there is as yet little agreement upon exactly what mechanism or mechanisms underlie the phenomenology of temporal order. 

So we can expect the task of determining which mechanisms and neural processes underlie our temporal phenomenology to be a complex one that appeals to some quite large number of possibly autonomous systems. Contra what some might pre-theoretically have expected, our phenomenology turns out not to be a single, unified, experience subserved by a single complicated system. 

If all of the various different mechanisms that are jointly responsible for our temporal phenomenology are responsive to a single pervasive feature of the world, then that feature of the world is a good candidate to be time. Interestingly, since there are so many different mechanisms responsible for our phenomenology, the (fairly remote) possibility presents itself that some of those mechanisms might be responsive to different features of the world. It would then, we take it, be an open question whether just one of those features of the world is time, and some of our temporal phenomenology is tracking something that is not time, or whether none of the features of the world would be time, or whether time would somehow turn out to be some complex mixture of different features in the world. 

What possibilities like this tell us is that the subject setting constraints of disciplines like psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience, are important precisifications of some aspects of the folk theory, but are not the whole story. First, they are not the whole story because in the scenario just described nothing in psychology or cognitive science tells us whether we should conclude that time is one of the features of the world being tracked by one of our cognitive mechanisms, while the other features being tracked by our mechanisms are not time, or whether we should conclude that time is multiply realised in the world, or whether we should conclude that there is no time as such, there are just multiple different time-like features of the world each of which is tracked by our phenomenology. Psychology tells us what mechanisms are responsible for our temporal phenomenology and psychology tells us what sorts of proximal causes those mechanisms are responsive to. Physics tells us the story of the world at its most fundamental level. Then we try to bring the two stories together. But neither discipline seems well placed to tell us what to do if there is no pervasive structural feature of the world to which each of the mechanisms responsible for our temporal phenomenology is responsive. 

That is why we think that psychology cannot be the sole subject setter. Suppose each mechanism that is responsible for some aspect of our temporal phenomenology tracks a different feature of the world. How are we to determine which of these various features of the world is time? In part we may be able to answer this by appealing to the 
subject setting roles of other disciplines. For perhaps some, but not all, of these features of the world play the t-role in other disciplines. One is inclined to say that if just one of these features plays the t-role in all the other special sciences, then that feature is time. If different features of the world play the t-role in different special sciences then perhaps one is inclined to say that there is no unified phenomenon to which  “time” refers but rather, there is a set of features that each have time-like properties and each of which is tracked by some psychological mechanism and plays an explanatory role in some special science. It is then an open question whether one concludes that there is no time, but there is a set of time-like things in the world, or one concludes that there is time, and what it is for there to be time just is for there to exist that set of time-like features of the world. 

Which way we answer this last question cannot, it would seem, be determined either by physics, psychology, or any other the other special sciences. It is a question we are faced with once we already know everything there is to know about fundamental physics, on the one hand, and about the constraints placed upon it by the special sciences, on the other hand. We think that if such a scenario were to arise then further higher-level more abstract constraints would be brought to bear and these would arise from our folk concept of time. In particular, they would arise from those aspects of the folk concept not already captured and precisified by the various special sciences. It might be, for instance, that part of the high-level folk concept of time is that time is a unified pervasive structural feature of the world. On the scenario we have just described there is no such feature. So we would conclude that there is no time, there are merely the various time-like features of the world. If the folk concept was somewhat different then we would, instead, conclude that time just is the set of time-like features of the world. 

Thus there could be ways things could turn out to be, such that we would need to appeal to the folk theory of time once we had exhausted all of the constraints imposed by the various special sciences. Another scenario in which that might be true would be if there were a unique structural feature of reality that each of the mechanisms that are jointly responsible for our temporal phenomenology track, but where that structural feature is very unlike what we intuitively suppose to be time. Here, again, appealing to the constraints imposed by the other special sciences can be expected to do some work. For if the structural feature tracked by our various psychological mechanisms turned out not to be the structural feature that plays the t-role in the other special sciences then we might conclude that whatever it is that is tracked by those mechanisms is not time. Rather, perhaps time is whatever realises the t-role in the other special sciences and we are subject to some sort of pervasive phenomenological illusion. On the other hand, if what plays the t-role in the other special sciences is exactly what is tracked by the psychological mechanisms that underlie our temporal phenomenology, then it seems more likely we will be inclined to say that time turns out to be radically different than we expected. 

Notice that in both these scenarios the constraints arising from the other special sciences are important in determining the right thing to say under various circumstances. Notice also, however, that they are not sufficient to determine what we should say. For it is no part of psychology, or the other special sciences, that if our psychological mechanisms track something that is radically different to how we expect time to be, and if what realises the t-role in the other special sciences is somewhat like we expected time to be, then time turns out to be what realises the t-role in the other special sciences. If that is true, then it is true because of some higher-level constraint: the kind of constraint that would feature in folk theory. 

Precisely what folk theory is in these cases is up for grabs; neither of us is committed to the view that it’s just what people happen to think at a certain point in time: the kind of thing that could be detected by experimental philosophy.​[10]​ For these are notoriously fragile,​[11]​ especially in the face of surprising empirical discoveries. But there could be more robust facts about what we would be inclined to do in the face of the discovery that the special sciences are not pulling in the same direction. Perhaps, for example, there is a cognitive role for ‘time’ in action guiding which is univocal even if the phenomena in the world are not, and if so this might pull in the direction of deciding that time exists but is a mixture of naturally disparate phenomena. So exactly what these additional constraints consist in is unclear. What is clear is that a lot of the work of determining what time is, in the world, will be done by the constraints provide by the special sciences and the physical story provided by physics. What is also clear is that some questions can remain unanswered by the combination of those constraints and the physical data, and those questions are ones that require higher-level adjudication that can only be attained by reflection on folk theory. 

2.2 Special Sciences Sans Subject Setting Role

We think that at least some of the explanatory projects of some of the special sciences regarding temporal phenomena might turn out not to be the kind of projects that play any kind of subject setting role. To see why, we consider a couple of examples.

2.3 Evolutionary Theory and Geology

Very often in interdisciplinary work on time geological time and evolutionary time are mentioned. Both are important concepts: both largely the result of the astonishment with which the century-old discovery that geological and even biological history was many orders of magnitude longer than had been thought. Sometimes debates in evolutionary theory, such as about punctuated equilibria, are taken to be about time: the issue here is whether evolutionary ‘time’ proceeds smoothly, or speeds up in rapid speciation events and slows down in long periods of relatively slow drift. 

There is a real question whether these uses of ‘time’ are metaphorical. In the case of the deep time of geology the notion of “deep time” can be parsed away with the claim that there has been a surprisingly long time between the present and when certain rocks were formed. Deep time is not a special kind of time. In the case of the speeding up and slowing down of time according to some accounts of evolutionary ‘time’, this notion be replaced with the claim that the amount of evolutionary change that takes place in a fixed amount of time is very variable: sometimes a great amount, sometimes little. No kind of time speeds up or slows down

Nonetheless once this is done, do these sciences play a subject setting role? It might be thought that they do: time is that thing in which evolutionary and geological processes are embedded, and that might be one of the constraints on lower level theories of time.

Here, we think, matters are a little complicated. Certainly if (as we expect it is) contemporary geology and evolutionary theory are roughly right, then it might count as a constraint on lower level theories that they are theories of, amongst other things, the structure in which the many different geological eras are embedded, and in which different regions of evolutionary history are located. But it’s not clear that this t-role has any the improved or clarified status over some of the roles specified by the folk theory. Rather, it is as though these disciplines have embedded in them the folk notion of time, without refining that notion in any way. For, in effect, all the t-role articulated above says is that time is the structure in which events are embedded and ordered. But that is, inter alia, what the folk theory says. Of course these theories contain extraordinary discoveries about time: how much there is and how surprisingly distributed in it are things of whose past existence we have evidence. But none of this, we suggest, constrains our account of time itself.

Another way to see this is to consider not what the consequences for our account of time would be if what these theories say is true, but, rather, what the consequences would be if they were false. In the case of psychology such a discovery could be potentially very important: we can imagine possible, if implausible, scenarios in which psychology discovers that it cannot be the case that the features of the word physics takes to be best candidates for being time are what is being detected or measured by any brain processes. As we noted earlier, this would cause doubts about whether this feature in physics deserves to be called ‘time’. But what would the consequences of radical error in evolutionary theory be? If it turns out per impossibile that geological processes took only a thousand years then this would be a discovery that would tell us something about the world using the notion of time, but not anything that could change our account of time’s own nature. And what if evolution was entirely false? Say the world was built, complete with misleading evidence, by aliens in 1901. And suppose those aliens didn’t evolve but were the result of a quantum accident millennia ago, and they have been building worlds ever since—so the galaxy is full of life, but none of it evolved. Improbable and mad beyond belief, of course, but it’s a hypothesis that can be entertained, and a hypothesis that would seem to have no effect or constraint on the nature of time at all. So if a theory can be entirely false without affecting time, then it suggests that the theory itself is not part of the subject setting process. To the extent that the theories just discussed mention time, the theoretical apparatus is borrowed from the folk theory (or perhaps defers to other special sciences). Thus if any such theory is falsified without falsifying the folk theory from which the time role was borrowed, the time role remains undisturbed. What we have learned, then, is that in order for a special science to play a subject setting role with respect to time—a role not already played by a higher-level folk theory—that science must take some aspect of the folk theory of time and precisify, clarify, or otherwise build on that theory. 

3. Different Roles for Different Sciences

When we considered the particular role of psychology in providing constraints on lower level disciplines we noticed that it is possible that each of the various mechanisms jointly responsible for our temporal phenomenology might track a different feature of the world. We wondered, in that context, which of those various features ought to count as being time. That problem is writ large when we consider all of the special sciences and the constraints they jointly bring to bear. For the special sciences might, between them, place entirely different, and inconsistent, constraints on the lower level disciplines. There might be no consistent set of t-roles that includes the t-roles found in each of the special sciences. If that were so, then any phenomenon that would answer to ‘time’ relative to the constraints of one special science would not count as being time relative to the constraints of another. 

This might occur if the original folk theory of time was itself inconsistent, and different special sciences incorporated and made precise different aspects of that theory. If that occurs then, we think, what it is in the world that ought to count as being time cannot entirely be adjudicated from within the special and fundamental sciences. Since the set of t-roles is inconsistent, nothing in the world will answer to those t-roles. Perhaps something will answer to some, but not other, roles. But if there are multiple features of the world each of which answer to some, but not other roles, then we are again left wondering which, if any, of these features is time. One proposal suggests that in this event we return to the folk theory and determine which of the various aspects of the folk theory were most central to that theory—again with the caveat that for this to have normative power those further aspects of folk theory need to be due to deep facts about human cognition, not just transitory weightings on the cluster of t-roles in a certain culture at a certain time. Then if there is a special science, or sciences, that consistently clarifies the more central aspects of folk theory, and if there is some feature of the world that realises that set of roles thus clarified, then that feature of the world is a good deserver to count as being time. Even if this is not the correct proposal, however, it is hard to see how we could determine the right thing to say about time without prescinding from the special sciences to a normatively powerful higher-level theory. 

Even supposing there is a consistent set of t-roles it remains an open question whether there is any single phenomenon that realises all, or most, of those roles. If what it takes for there to be time is for there to be a unique realiser of that set of roles then it might turn out that there is no time even if there is something that realises the role of some, but not other, t-variables in some of the special sciences. Or one might be inclined to say that whatever it is that plays a good number of the t-roles counts as time even if the t-roles of some special sciences are not realised at all. Or one might say that there is no unified thing that is time: instead there is time in this special science, and time in that special science, and each of these is realised by some distinctive feature of the complete story of physics. Which of these turns out to be the right story about time will depend, in part, on whether there is a single phenomenon to be found in the physics that realises all or most of the t-roles. But if there is no such phenomenon then the answer to the question ‘what is time’ cannot be answered by attempting to locate time in the physical story of the world by appealing to the constraints of the special sciences. It can only be answered by considering the details of the folk theory of time not found in any of the special sciences. If the folk theory requires only that most of the folk roles (and hence most of the precisified t-roles of the special sciences) need be played, then finding something in physics that plays most of those roles is to find time. If the folk theory requires that all the roles be played, then finding that there is nothing in the physics that plays all the roles is finding that there is no time. If folk theory requires that some central roles be played, but that other roles are less important, then whatever plays those central roles, as delineated by the special sciences, is time, even if it does not play the more peripheral roles. 

Despite the fact that we think there are some complicated scenarios in which it would be necessary to appeal to the some version of folk theory to settle the matter of where to locate time in the fundamental theory of the world, we also think that much of this work will be done by the special sciences. We thus think that there is much to say about the interplay between the special sciences and the lower-level disciplines. In what follows we consider just a few of the ways in which the special sciences will interact with and constrain lower level disciplines and what this might reveal to us about the nature of time.

3.1 Could Physics Autonomously Abolish Time?
 
There is an obvious reply to our claim that the special sciences play a constraining, subject-setting role on physics. Physicists might, we think, with good cause go about declaring “there is no time” even if it turns out that there is some unique phenomenon that plays all of the t-roles. It would thus seem as though physics has autonomously abolished time, unconstrained by the special sciences—for the thing the special sciences call time might very well still exist. How could that be if the special sciences are the subject setters? Our view is that situations like this are ones in which there is conceptual change; where the term ‘time’ has shifted in meaning within physics until it is no longer constrained by the other sciences. But such a case offers no objection to the claim that the special sciences play the role of settling the general language designation of ‘time’. 

Suppose events proceeded as follows. Physicists make the (apparent) discovery that what plays that t-role is some feature of quantum collapse (we do not suggest this is plausible, it is for illustration purposes only). Time is, say the physicists, this process of quantum collapse. For a long while this is the orthodoxy, and indeed, after some long period the various t-roles in the special sciences are largely forgotten within physics. For physicists, time just is the process of quantum collapse. One day an amazing discovery is made: the theory of quantum mechanics, and with it, quantum collapse, is falsified. There is no quantum collapse, and there is nothing even remotely like any such collapse. Orthodoxy is overturned. Not only is this the discovery that a bedrock theory of physics is false, it is also the discovery that there is no time. Or so say many physicists. For ‘time’ for those physicists, has simply come to mean the phenomenon of quantum collapse. Just as, we think, chemists might come to claim  “there is no water” if tomorrow we discover that there is no H20, likewise these physicists claim that there is no time because there is no quantum collapse. But that, of course, is consistent with there being something that plays the t-roles in the special sciences, just as the discovery that there is no H20 is consistent with there being something in the world that is clear and potable and hence plays the ‘watery role’. That clear potable substance is likely to still be called ‘water’ in the general vocabulary, if not in the special vocabulary of chemistry. Similarly, we have described a situation in which physicists now take ‘time’ to pick out some particular physical process or structure, which, as it turns out, does not exist. Given this, they are right when they say that there is no time. But the rest of us would equally be right to say that there is time. For in the more general vocabulary of the rest of us, time just the thing, whatever it is, that plays the t-roles. And we have not been told that there is none of that.

This picture leaves room for the following: there could be a radical replacement of theories within physics that would, rightly, lead physicists to claim that there is no time, whilst that same discovery might, rightly, lead the rest of us to claim that time is simply something very different to what physicists had previously told us. This latter will occur when the replacement theories are sufficiently different from the original theories in physics that physicists took to exemplify a theory of time, whilst at the same being such as to vindicate the explanatory role of the t-variable in the special sciences.

The previous scenario is a nice example of the ways in which physics and the special sciences interact. The direction of constraint is one-way: from the special sciences to the physics. Even though physicists might announce that there is no time, the special sciences might have legitimate use for the notion. It’s only because of conceptual change in the physics community that their putative discovery counts as a discovery that there is no time. In the ordinary vocabulary it is still the special sciences that play the subset setting role. Physics, on the other hand, is still playing a determining role: it is determining whether there is anything in our world that plays the roles laid out by the special sciences—a question to some degree independent of the question of whether it discovers there is something answering to what it has come to call ‘time’. 

One might worry, however, that matters are not as straightforward as we have suggested. For if physics tells us that nothing plays the t-roles then it (likely) follows that some or all of the special sciences are false. There is, then, an open question about whether, in the event that the special sciences are false and nothing plays the t-roles, we should conclude that there is no time, or we should conclude that the special sciences were mistaken in their subject setting role: somehow they set the wrong subject. In the former case the special sciences continue to set the subject, it just turns out that nothing in the world answers to the subject that they set; in the latter case it turns out that they do not continue to set the subject and it is then an open question whether or not there is any time. In order to consider this second hypothesis there are two scenarios worth examining. 


3.2 Timelessness and unordered time-slices

Suppose that physics tells us that our world is like a deck of cards: each card has certain events and objects located on it, but the cards are not in any particular order in the following sense.​[12]​ There is no fact of the matter, for any two cards, whether one card is before, or after, the other card. In this analogy the cards play the role of three-dimensional ‘instants” of the world: but they are instants without it being the case that one instant occurs before, or after, any other instant.

 If our world were this way there is no reason to suppose that the special sciences would not have, and continue to enjoy, the same explanatory and predictive power that they do.  Indeed, insofar as palaeontologists tell us that there is some set of instants at which there exist dinosaurs, they are (we may suppose) correct to say so. Insofar as the various theories in the special sciences allow us to predict what occurs at other instants, they are explanatory successful. The use of the term “t” in the various calculations by such disciplines allows them correctly to predict the properties of other instants. Yet strictly speaking the theories of the special sciences are false since their theories are either explicitly or tacitly committed to the existence of temporal orderings and in the scenario under consideration there are no such orderings.





Another even more sceptical hypothesis is the simulation hypothesis considered by Bostrom, Chalmers, and Weatherson.​[13]​ According to this hypothesis we are asked to take seriously, due to various interesting arguments that need not detain us here, the claim that the actual world is a computer simulation. This is a kind of scepticism that might seem to have very profound bottom-up influences on the idea of time in the special sciences. You might think this would amount not just to the falsity of detailed claims in the special sciences (there are no geological strata, there never were any trilobites) but also to the possible rejection of the claims about the nature of time in the special sciences (maybe the underlying simulation is static and doesn’t have a dimension that corresponds to the special sciences’ notion of time). That is, one might wonder whether in such an event one would be inclined to suppose that the special sciences have no subject setting role.

We will proceed by considering two broad kinds of response.

3.3.1 Business as usual 

One tempting response to the simulation hypotheses, associated with David Chalmers,​[14]​ is that it leaves everything, including physics, untouched. According to this response, if simulationism is true about the word, then physics is right as far as it goes (and so are the special sciences). It’s just that there are more truths about the world than physics mentions. Instead of the ultimate reality being the strings or fundamental particles mentioned in physics, there is a deeper level of reality: the computational substrate that realizes them. But then everything in the special sciences about time is untouched, and is realized by something in physics in much the way as before. The special sciences never made any claims about the realization, in the physical world, of their claims about where in time to find the origin of the moon or dinosaurs. Simulationism is just one, albeit unlikely, such hypothesis. And equally physics itself perhaps has no ‘that’s all’ clause built into it: that’s the job of specifically philosophical theses like physicalism. The physicist means only by ‘fundamental’ ‘our theory doesn’t say anything more about the nature of these things beyond what they do in our theory’. So if, say, strings are realized by something odd, interesting, but not in tension with string theory (unless it makes predictions at odds with it) then physics and the special sciences remain true theories, and time turns out to be whatever it is, in the physics, that the special sciences locate by way of the constraints they impose.

3.3.2 The radical revision hypothesis

But this isn’t the only response you might make: the view that there turns out to be no real time, and perhaps even no real dinosaurs, is defensible. But we think when you understand how this defence proceeds it undermines the idea that there is bottom up subject setting going on.

Here’s how the defence might proceed. Perhaps in the simulating universe where the computers are located everything takes very little time. Perhaps it takes no time: the structure of the simulation is static in some way. So if we were to understand how it all worked, we would see it was an illusion in our simulation that dinosaurs are located in time differently from us. So the ‘t’ term in the simulation does not code for time at all (maybe nothing does: maybe one of the spatial dimensions does!). On this hypothesis what the special sciences are saying about time, and perhaps much else, is mistaken. The question, then is whether this is a case in which lower-level disciplines (perhaps lower even than physics) determine that nothing plays the t-roles specified by the social sciences, or whether these lower level disciplines in some way undermine the subject setting role of the special sciences, or otherwise play a subject setting role themselves. In favour of the latter, one might wonder if such a discovery is a discovery that everything we ever thought about time—and what it would take for there to be time—was simply mistaken.

But not so fast. Notice that explicating this scenario required us to imagine a simulating universe a bit like the one we imagine ours to be. If the universe doing the simulating was just a strange mathematical abstraction, for example, then we’d be inclined to default back to the ‘business as usual’ response. But if we imagine the simulating universe to be very much like the one we imagine our own universe to be, we thereby imagine that there is time in the simulating universe. It is only then that we are in a position to say that the various parts of the simulation are not arranged in time in a way that would vindicate the temporal claims of physics or the special sciences. 

But how do we locate time in the simulating universe? Only because we imagine things in that universe to be structurally sufficiently similar to the way we thought (perhaps mistakenly) they were in the simulated universe! And that is to say that enough of our understanding of the special sciences at a general level is true of the simulating universe, even if not of ours, for us to identify time in it. So the special sciences will be playing a subject setting role for time, even if not for time in our universe.






So why, then, do we engage in this interdisciplinary work on time of which this book is an example. Many reasons. But we hope we have identified one important one. It’s that in answering questions like ‘what is time’ and ‘is there time’ no scientific discipline (much less philosophy) alone can do the job. For to identify which features of our fundamental picture of the word we need to look to in order to determine if there is time, and what it is like, we need to compare and contrast the sciences. We need to see whether these features of the world are playing the relevant explanatory and causal roles described in the special sciences. If there is a unique thing that exists and plays those roles and has a certain nature which physics can tell us about, then that’s sufficient to answer the question of whether there is time, and what it is. If not, then things get more complicated; but they still involve this interdisciplinary connexion.

Of course not all interdisciplinary meetings will be motivated by the sorts of subject setting considerations we have outlined. Perhaps there are other motivations and useful explanatory projects: and sometimes such meetings will indeed have the flavour of the postmodern gallery. But perhaps we have been a little hard on the postmodern gallery, especially when its exhibits are science and philosophy. For sometimes there are serendipitously useful thoughts that can be had only by strolling its exhibits. We like to think this paper is one of them.

David Braddon-Mitchell, The University of Sydney
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